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Standing just outside the ancient city walls, facing the city gates across a dusty 
highway, the stele commemorating Qubilai Khan’s 1252 conquest of Dali, the strategic 
capital of the region, is hidden from the passing traffic by a string of ramshackle 
buildings clustered along the coastal highway. The stele, originally engraved in 1304, 
was discovered in 1962 and then in 1991 set up in its small commemorative compound 
not far from the three pagodas for which Dali is renowned. The presence of a 
commemorative stele is hardly an unusual sight in China since much of Chinese history 
has been recorded in stone engravings, and these stone records, the steles, which seem to 
clutter up every provincial museum in the country, form the basis for the later chronicles 
and historical biographies and records that were traditionally compiled and written up by 
each succeeding dynasty. The Ming compilers of the Yuan Shi seem to have gleaned their 
information on Yunnan’s Mongol past from this particular stele and its very memorable 
record which describes Qubilai’s pacification of the province employing peaceful means 
and resisting the use of violence even in the face of extreme provocation. 
In the eighth year of Dade of Yuan (1304), a high-ranking Mongol official Ye Su 
Da Er (Yesudaer, governor of Yunnan) known in Chinese as Pin Zhang Zheng Shi, 
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proposed the erection of a commemorative stele in memory of Qubilai Khan (Yuan Shi-
zu) and his pacification of Yunnan. The stele was composed by Cheng Wen-hai, a native 
of Huizhou, Anhui province, an official in the prestigious Han Lin academy, and 
describes the process of pacification of Yunnan and the establishment of prefectures and 
counties there by Qubilai Khan, Yuan Shi-zu, the founder of the Yuan dynasty. The 
successful pacification of Yunnan saw a change in the tactics of conquest used by the 
Mongols in keeping with the vision and practices of the Toluids and ensured the peaceful 
incorporation of the province into the emerging Yuan Empire. In fact the conquest of 
Dali not only represented a change in Mongol tactics but also signalled a change in the 
traditional methods of regional domination as practiced for many centuries by the Han 
Chinese on their neighbours prior to these events. Non-Han people had been viewed by 
the dominant Han Chinese as barbarians deserving the most barbarous and savage 
treatment and as a consequence the history of the region had been marked by the most 
brutal of attacks and hostility on the part of the dominant northerly Han neighbours. 
Sichwan and Yunnan had both experienced centuries of brutality from the Han and 
therefore this new approach initiated by Qubilai would have been most welcome and 
indicative of a clear break with the past. Song troops had been encouraged to use 
excessive force and submission to jimizhou or ‘haltered-and-bridled’2 status was sought 
through intimidation. The prize was the natural resources of Sichwan and Yunnan and the 
indigenous people had to be subdued at any costs including terror, deceit, and massacre.3 
                                                 
2 Richard von Glahn, The Country of Streams and Grottoes: Expansion, Settlement, and the Civilizing of 
the Sichuan Frontier in Song Times. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 37. 
 
3 For an in-depth study of Song expansion into Sichwan and the south-west see von Glahn, The Country of 
Streams and Grottoes; Joseph F. Rock, The Ancient Na-Khi Kingdom of Southwest China. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1947. 
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Despite the success of the Yuan dynasty in co-opting the people of Yunnan, the Ming 
regime returned to this traditional barbarity following the demise of the Mongols in 
China. 
However, welcome as this negotiated approach might have been on the ground, 
recent studies have suggested that this negotiated occupation resulted in a far from stable 
regime and even encouraged unrest and rebellion in the neighbouring states of the 
southwest long after other parts of China had been subdued.4 John Herman argues that 
having opted for negotiation over traditional brute force and terror, the Mongol 
commanders were forced to rely on local rulers and collaborators whose loyalty could not 
be guaranteed and who were not necessarily accepted by the indigenous people either. 
The reverence in which the Mongol appointed leaders, most particularly Sayyid ‘Ajall, 
have been held since their appointment suggests that the Mongol leadership achieved at 
least some measure of success. With the seizure of power by Möngke Khan, the House of 
Tolui now dominated the Mongol Empire and in China and Iran the Toluid ‘philosophy’ 
of inclusion and the development of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural elite, the younger 
brothers of the Qa’an, Hülegü and Qubilai, were able to put into practice the Toluid 
alternative to the traditional brute force of the steppe. 
After the upheavals of the actual conquest of the province, the Toluid Mongols 
appointed a trustworthy official whose family, originally from Bokhara, had been in their 
service since the 1220s. Sayyid ‘Ajall Shams al-Dīn ‘Umar Bukhārī (1211-79) had served 
the Mongols in a variety of positions and locations. Mongol rule through the offices of 
this Central Asian Muslim, Sayyid ‘Ajall, also saw the establishment of a strong Muslim 
                                                 
4 John Herman, “Mongol Conquest of Dali: the Failed Second Front,” in Warfare in Inner Asian History 
(500-1800), ed. Nicola di Cosmo. (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 295-335. 
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presence in Yunnan which has persisted until the present day. Strategically Dali, the 
capital of the region, dominated access to the southern Silk Road through Mien (Burma) 
and to the lands of Annam (North Vietnam 安南) and the position of governor demanded 
not only administrative ability and considerable political sensitivity but loyalty and trust. 
Yet again the Mongols had turned to the Muslims of Turkistan to find such an appointee. 
In the 1250s the Sung were still a presence in the south and Möngke Qa’an 
planned to launch military operations against the rump state from the Dali area, using 
Yunnan as a bridgehead.5 The Sung had managed to maintain their pressure on the 
northern front and Möngke felt the prestige of the Empire was being challenged by his 
failure to subdue the Chinese. By opening a second front the Sung would be forced to 
divert military resources from the north and in so doing weaken their whole military 
strategy. In addition Dali was an important source of horses for the region and the Sung 
in particular prized the horses which had been reared for centuries in this area and for 
which the Dali kingdom’s predecessor, the Nanzhao kingdom, had also been famous. The 
market town of Yushi owed its considerable prosperity to horse trading and the Mongols 
aimed to cut the town’s source of livelihood.6  
 
the Dali horse has a shape (that is) quite magnificent. They stand low with a 
muscular front, very similar to the shape of a chicken. The diaphragm is broad, 
shoulders thick, waist flat and back round. They are trained to squat on their rear 
ends like a dog. They easily climb steep terrain on command, and possess both 
speed and agility in chase. They have been raised on bitter buckwheat so they 
require little to maintain. How could a horse like this not be considered a good 
horse?7 
                                                 
5 Thomas Allsen, The Mongol Imperialism. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 4. 
 
6 Herman, “Mongol Conquest,”  pp. 300-01. 
 
7 Tian Wen, Qian Shu (1690), juan 3, p.76, cited in Herman, “Mongol Conquest,” p. 301. 
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Horses along side mineral products such as gold, silver, and copper swelled the 
Yushi bazaars and fed the appetite of the Sung merchants and it was this lucrative market 
and supply line that the Mongols intended to disrupt. By crippling the Sung’s supply lines 
in the south, the Mongols hoped to disable their war machine in the north. 
The conception of the strategy to attack the Sung using the people of the 
southwest is credited to Guo Baoyu, a Han Chinese from Shaanxi who had been serving 
with the Chin at the time of the early Mongol conquests in the North. At an audience with 
Chinggis Khan recorded in Guo Baoyu’s biography in the Yuan Shi, the strategist warns 
against under-estimating the strength of the Sung heartlands and he advised employing 
the tribes of the south-west against the enemy. “The bravery and fierceness of the tribes 
of the southwest should be put to use by first subjugating them, and then using them to 
surround the territory.”8  
The process of conquest in this region especially the initial occupation saw the 
adoption of radically different tactics on the part of Qubilai himself which reflected the 
influence of his Chinese advisers and also belatedly his mother, Sorqaghtani, who had 
played such a central role in his own up-bringing and education and that of his brothers. 
It was under his mother’s tutelage that the future Toluid emperor had learned the merit of 
enlisting Chinese scholars as administrators and the value of the Han literati as political 
allies in his long quest for political ascendancy.9 In the Yuan Shi, the account of the Dali 
                                                 
 
8 “Biography of Guo Baoyu” Yuan Shi, juan 149, p. 3521; cited in Jacqueline Misty Armijo-Hussein, 
“Sayyid ‘Ajall Shams al-Din: A Muslim from Central Asia, serving Mongols in China, and bringing 
Civilization to Yunnan,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Diss. Harvard University, 1996), p. 151. 
 
9 Wang, E. The Fall of the Jurchen Chin. Ed. Hok-lam Chan (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993), pp. 10-12. 
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campaign is given at the beginning of Qubilai’s biography which could suggest that for 
the royal prince the campaign represented his coming of age as a Mongol warrior and 
statesman. It was essential that the native population accepted and supported the invading 
forces and Qubilai’s Han Chinese advisers were adamant that he should resist all 
provocation and desist from any general massacres. The Dali Stele is a testament to the 
success that those advisers enjoyed. 
The main events following the decision to invade Yunnan are set down on the 
Dali Stele and confirmation can be found in other sources. The following is from the Dali 
Stele. 
 
Thus in Ren Zi year, one year after the coronation of Xianzong (Möngke) 
emperor, the Shizu (Qubilai) emperor, who was the brother of the Xianzong 
(Möngke), had received the order to crusade against Yunnan. Our troops were 
dispatched in September. They crossed the Huanghe river in December, passed 
through Ningxia the next spring, Xiaguan in April, and were stationed at 
Liupanshan Mountain; then they crossed the Tao river, passed through Tubo. Our 
troops were divided into three parts, and slaughter, plunder and arson were 
forbidden. We sent a diplomatic envoy to Dali to summon the enemies to 
surrender but failed due to the blockage of the road. In October, after crossing the 
Dadu River, our emperor led the cavalry, which are the middle troops of three 
parts, to advance ahead. In November, our troops had crossed Lushui River (the 
upper Jinshangjiang River), everywhere our troops passed through submitted to 
our country. Again, a diplomatic envoy was sent to Dali to summon the enemies 
to surrender, but our envoy was killed by them. In December, our troops 
approached the capital of Dali, which is surrounded by Cangshan Mountain and 
Erhai Lake, firm and solid. Duan Zhishan, the king of Dali and his minister Gao 
Taixiang led their troops and went out, defeated utterly by our army. Our emperor 
sent out diplomatic envoys three times, but they were refused by the king of Dali. 
Then our emperor gave the order to attack. Meanwhile, the west and east troops 
had arrived in Dali. Our emperor looked down on the city from the top of 
Cangshan Mountain. Our army breached and occupied the city that night. Duan 
Zhishan escaped to Shanchan (Kunming), and Gao Taixiang was captured and 
decapitated in Yaozhou (Yaoan county), to warn the people who dared to resist. 
The Mongol army moved on to another place; everywhere except Shanchan 
surrendered. In the next spring, our emperor led part of his army on a return north, 
and General Uriyangqadai was left in charge. Before long, Shanchan city was 
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captured and Duan Zhishan was caught and escorted to our capital. Our emperor 
did not execute him, but released him instead. 
 
Accounts of the invasion can be found in various Chinese sources primarily the 
Yuan Shi but other documents such as the chronicles of You Zhong also record the stages 
in the conquest. In July 1252, Möngke had ordered the advance south and Qubilai had 
summoned Chang Wen-ch’ien to serve as his military adviser along with various Han 
Chinese assistants including Yao Shu and Liu Ping-chung. He planned a three pronged 
advance with Uriyangqadai Noyan leading the western column south from Lintao, Gansu 
province, through eastern Tibet, Wang Dezhen (d.1259) with the imperial princes Corqa 
(Chaohe) and Yezhilie10 leading the eastern column through Sung dominated areas of 
Sichwan, and himself leading the middle column along the mountain trails of Kham. 
Assembling their armies in Shaanxi in October, 1253, they first traversed the 
mountainous province of Sichwan in order to reach the waters of the Kincha river which 
feeds northern Yunnan. Crossing the river in rafts they were met by submissive tribes but 
after so many gruelling months on the road, he and his army under the command of 
Uriyangqadai, son of the great Noyan, Sübe’etei (d. 1248), arrived ‘hungry and naked.’11 
It was on this occasion that Sayyid ‘Ajall, possibly in his capacity as a keshig, served his 
commander so admirably that his future fortune was ensured. At the time of Qubilai’s 
advance on Yunnan province, Sayyid ‘Ajall was charged with securing provisions and 
funding for the imperial armies and it was his efficiency and timely actions at this time 
                                                 
10 “Biography of Qubilai Khan”, Yuan Shi, juan 4, pt. I, pp. 58-60, translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, 
“Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 154. 
 
11 Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi al-Tavārīkh. Eds. Muammad Rawshan and Muafā Mūsavī (Tehran: Elbruz, 
1994), Vol. 2, p. 914. 
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which so fortuitously came to the notice of the prince and ensured his subsequent 
future.12 
Rashīd al-Dīn’s text seems confused about the identity of the official suggesting 
that it was Sayyid ‘Ajall’s grandson who welcomed the army. However, this would have 
been impossible since at forty Sayyid ‘Ajall is unlikely to have had a serving grandson. 
Similar confusion surrounds the background of this very significant figure in the Chinese 
sources. Grandfather, father, and grandson are merged in the biographical account given 
in the Yuan Shi. However the following can be deduced. 
Sayyid ‘Ajall’s namesake, his grandfather Shams al-Dīn ‘Umar Bukhārī 
(Saidianchi Shan siding Wuma’er), reputedly a descendant of the prophet through ‘Alī b. 
Abī ālib, had surrendered with his charges, a thousand horsemen, and gifts of a striped 
leopard and white falcons to Chinggis Khan when the conqueror swept into Bukhārā in 
1220. The grandfather and his troops joined the Mongol armies while his son, Kamāl al-
Dīn became a ‘hostage’ serving in the elite royal guards, the keshig and eventually earned 
distinction as one of Chinggis Khan’s personal bodyguards.13 It was Kamāl al-Dīn who 
presumably earned the title Sayyid ‘Ajall which was then passed down to his son, a very 
young keshig, who first appears in the sources ca. 1229 when he was appointed by 
Ögödai (r.1229-41) as a darughachi to the prefectures of Feng, Ching, and Yün-nei on 
the Sino-Mongol frontier. Later he was promoted to the position of yarghuchi, an 
arbitrator or judge, in the old Chin capital of Chang-tu.14  
                                                 
12 Yuan Shih, “Biography of Sayyid ‘Ajall,” translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 19. 
 
13 Igor de Rachewiltz et al., In the Service of the Khan. Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan 
Period 1200-1300. (Wiesbaden: Harrossowitz Verlag, 1993), p. 467. 
 
14 de Rachewiltz et al., In the Service of the Khan, p. 470. 
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The Yuan Shi details more of the travails endured by Qubilai Khan and his 
operational commander, Uriyangqadai Noyan (1201-72), on the Dali campaign, and the 
respected scholar and official, Yao Shui, the nephew of Yao Shu,15 recounts the even 
more arduous return trek after the successful conclusion of the initial campaign. The 
mountainous terrain which greeted the advancing army after their gruelling advance of 
several hundred miles across Gansu and Sichwan is some of the most ferocious in China 
and yet their military tactics maintained their hallmark decisiveness and subterfuge. A 
surprise attack was launched after a forced march through the mountains followed by the 
crossing of the icy cold waters of the Jinsha River which is fed directly from the melting 
snow of the Himalayas. The army crossed the treacherous waters with individual soldiers 
clinging to inflated animal skins and so achieved their objective of surprise. But such 
ambitious and gruelling enterprises came at a cost and according to Rashīd al-Dīn out of 
a force of ten tumans (100,000) only two tumans arrived. Many tribes submitted without 
resistance. “The leader of the Mosuo barbarians came to welcome them and submit; his 
territory was located 400 li north of Dali.”16 The Baiman, however, as the Mongols 
arrived at the Daguo fortress attempted to conceal a cache of weapons while their 
commander negotiated submission. Qubilai felt obliged to attack and he slaughtered the 
leaders but left the people untouched. The Baiman people eventually conceded defeat and 
‘with great sincerity, sent presents and submitted.’17 In his biography of his uncle, Yao 
Shu, Yao Shui records that Qubilai considered this trek across Sichwan so arduous and 
                                                 
15 See Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 156. 
 
16 Yuan Shih, “Biography of Qubilai Khan,” translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 
152. 
 
17 Ibid., p.153. 
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demanding that he promised the survivors of the campaign honours to equal those his 
grandfather had awarded the legendary participants of the Baljuna covenant.18 
As was prescribed custom, envoys had been sent to the capital, Dali, offering 
terms for submission. However, since no response had been forthcoming the siege of the 
city was ordered. Before the Mongol armies were able to take Dali, the two brothers Gao 
Xiang, the prime minister, and Gao He, both of whom had been politically dominant in 
the province for some time, fled from the city under cover of darkness. The king, Duan 
Hsing-chih (r.1251-53) and the Duan clan who had traditionally ruled Qarajang from 
their capital at Dali had seen their power eclipsed by the Gao brothers, saw the arrival of 
the Mongol armies as their opportunity to regain their former power and glory. However, 
Qubilai’s first concern was with the fate of his three envoys, Yu Lushu, Wang Junhou, 
and Wang Jian, and he ordered his trusted advisor, Yao Shu, to search the city for his 
envoys. During the search all land charts and census records that were unearthed were 
collected for future consultation and use. The bodies of the envoys were subsequently 
discovered and Yao Shu performed burial sacrifices in their honour. The generals Ye Gu 
and Batu’er were sent in pursuit of the Gao brothers who were soon discovered in 
Yaozhou and were subsequently beheaded. In response to advice from the Chinese aides 
and presumably Liu Shizhong, the newly appointed Pacification commissioner, 
retribution was not sought from the people of Dali and their king’s family was allowed to 
return.19 
                                                 
18 Yao Shui, Muan Ji, juan 15, translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 156. 
 
19 Yao Shui, Muan Ji, juan 15, translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 154. 
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The feared and respected general Uriyangqadai dominated the early period of 
Mongol rule in Yunnan and it is not certain that he continued with Qubilai’s more 
humane policies now that he was in control. Qubilai greatly respected his general and the 
two had jointly led the campaign in the south. After Qubilai departed in the spring of 
1254, Uriyangqadai continued with the pacification of the province marching on 
Shanshan or Yachi to the Mongols (Kunming) while, according to one historian, ‘all 
along the way slaughtering (yantu tusha) the Luoluo (Yi) and Bai people of Helazhang 
(present-day Chuxiong and Luoci region) and Shuicheng (present-day northwest Luquan 
county).’20 In fact the Duan king had not initially submitted to Mongol rule and after Dali 
fell he made a last stand of defiance from Shanshan (Kunming), fortifying the city and 
organising resistance. The city was surrounded on three sides by Lake Dian leaving only 
one gate to be defended but for Uriyangqadai this did not present a problem.  
 
Continuously pounding the drums and gongs (which signal troop movements), for 
seven days and seven nights, they repeatedly advanced to attack or feigned attack, 
till the point that the enemy was completely disorientated and unable to respond.21 
 
The Yuan Shi’s biography of Uriyangqadai claims that a bloodbath ensued after 
the king was found to have escaped the city for the mountains where he was subsequently 
tracked and captured. His followers were killed but he was taken alive and eventually 
placed on his throne again. The Yuan Shi’s biography of Qubilai seems to contradict the 
more brutal aspects of this account.  
                                                 
20 You Zhong, Zhongguo Xi nan minzu shi, Kunming: Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1985; translated and 
cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 156. 
 
21 Yuan Shi, “Biography of Subotei (and Uriyangqadai),” translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid 
‘Ajall,” p. 157. 
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The great general Uriyangqadai stayed behind to protect and guard, Liu Shizhong 
was appointed pacification commissioner, the Duan clan was allowed to settle in 
peace in Dali and then the victorious army returned home.22  
 
The Dali Stele stresses Qubilai’s foresight and restraint in sparing the king. No 
mention is made of massacres and the suggestion strengthened by an anecdote in the 
Yuan Shi, concerning the influence of Qubilai’s Confucian advisers, is that such killing 
did not occur. 
 
The king of Dali was obstinate, he refused to submit to our country and killed our 
envoy, and our emperor had reason to kill all the Dali people but did not do so. 
Instead, he released the king of Dali and absolved the Dali people. Without the 
highest virtue, he would not have done so. 
 
The historian, You Zhong, along with the biographer of Uriyangqadai, are the 
sources for the accounts of excessive bloodletting which would accord with the picture 
commonly given of the self-promoting general and therefore not necessarily reliable. 
In 1255 Duan Xingzhi and his uncle, Xin Jufu, were presented to Möngke at the 
imperial court where they were each honoured as a ‘Bearer of the Tiger Tablet.’ Such 
treatment of defeated kings had precedent. Chinggis Khan had initiated the Mongol tactic 
of adopting the vanquished monarch into the ruling elite and the vanquished troops into 
the Mongol army. The Korean king had been treated thus in 1238. The next year Möngke 
demonstrated his confidence in King Duan Xingzhi by awarding him the title of 
Maharaja and made him the ‘leader of all the barbarians, the Baiman and the other tribes’ 
                                                 
22 Yuan Shi “Biography of Qubilai” Juan 4, part 1, pp. 58-60, translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, 
“Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 154. 
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while presenting him with a map of the region and formally requesting that he should 
pacify the whole area and implement a taxation regime.23 Möngke further made the 
king’s uncle, Xin Jufa, head of the army while the king appointed his younger brother, 
Xin Juri or Duan Shi, prime minister. To solidify their alliance with the Mongols, 
Maharaja Duan Xingzhi ‘together with Xin Jufu set off leading the Bo and Cuan armies, 
to join up with Uriyangqadai to assist him in his campaign against Jiaozhi (northern 
Vietnam).24 The military alliance proved crucial for Uriyangqadai’s success in the 
province whereas the Yuan Shi suggests that the prime minister was not so successful in 
achieving unity among the political appointees in his brother’s administration and court. 
With the fall of Shanshan (Kunming) and the establishment of the Duan led court 
in Qarajang (Yunnan), Uriyangqadai began campaigning in the neighbouring regions. 
When he temporarily fell ill his son, Ashu, took over and demonstrated the same ruthless 
efficiency as his father. The town of Chengjiang (Qiandege) decided to resist the Mongol 
siege only to have explosives placed all around the city walls and its moat filled with 
combustibles and dried grass. Chengjiang went up in flames and the citizens were unable 
to withstand the house to house fighting which ensued. As regions fell so Uriyangqadai’s 
army increased in size with the conquered troops enlisting in the Mongol army’s ranks. 
With his widespread campaigns in ethnically diverse Yunnan, Uriyangqadai’s army 
absorbed many indigenous people with a noticeably large number of Bai soldiers 
enlisting. Just as many Central Asian troops arrived with Qubilai and later with Sayyid 
                                                 
23 Yuan Shih, “Biography of Xin Juri,” p. 3910, translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 
163; Thomas Allsen, The Mongol Imperialism. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p.72. 
 
24 Yuan Shih, “Bibliography of Xin Juri,” p. 3910, translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” 
p. 163. 
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‘Ajall, so too did many Bai troops join Uriyangqadai and then followed him north to 
Hunan where they settled and are still found in large numbers today. 
In 1256 the general and his son launched a further campaign in the south which 
quickly overran the kingdoms of the White Barbarians (Baiman Guo) and Boli which is 
near the tea producing region of Pu’er and provided prestigious captive generals to be 
sent back to the imperial court for manacled presentation. Uriyangqadai even encountered 
the Song while campaigning. Heading north from Zhaotong to meet up with the main 
army in Sichwan the general encountered 30,000 Song troops and a division of their 
inland navy. The encounter resulted in the destruction or capture of 200 Song vessels 
along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. When he finally arrived at court for his 
audience with Möngke, he was able to boast that he had successfully brought the whole 
of Qarajang (Yunnan) under imperial command and qualified his claim with an 
impressive display of captured prisoners-of-war. The general could claim to have 
7,200,000 households on the books and paying taxes. The Dali Stele itemises his triumph 
implicitly expressing the approval of the court for his conquests. 
 
General Uriyangqadai moved on to attack other place of eastern Yunnan, 
conquered thirty-seven tribes of Wuman, attacked Jiaozhi country (northern 
Vietnam), captured its capital, conquered thirty-six tribes of Temoxidongman, 
Jinchi (Baoshan), Bai Yi, Luo Gui, Mianzhong (upper Burma), and finally 
conquer Yunnan entirely, and established local governments throughout Yunnan. 
There are thirty-seven general local governments, eight special local 
governments, sixty districts, fifty counties, sixty-one Dianbu villages, amount to 
1,287,753 families, which belong to each of the districts. The provincial 
government was established in Zhongqing (Shanchan, now Kunming) in order to 
rule Yunnan province. 
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He was able to request successfully that he be permitted to divide the province 
into administrative districts and was further granted permission to commence his next 
campaign into Jiaozhi, northern Vietnam. 
The various tribes and ethnic groups who lived in the region were the subject of a 
detailed study by an official, Li Jing from Hebei, appointed in 1301 as Deputy 
Pacification Commissioner with the rank of ‘Bearer of the Tiger Tablet’ to the Wusa 
Wumeng administrative unit based in Guizhou which borders modern day Yunnan. One 
of his tasks was to scour the whole region to procure supplies and funding for the Burma 
campaign in which the Mongols were then involved. His Yunnan Zhilüe25 was first 
written in 1303 in the form of a report but in 1331 it was edited and revised. When added 
to the description of the province which Marco Polo compiled a detailed picture of Yuan 
Yunnan emerges. Though other sources do not touch the detail of Li Jing, such writers as 
Marco Polo and Rashīd al-Dīn often confirm the reports compiled by Yuan official. 
The Bai people were found throughout the province and neighbouring areas and 
were prized for their silk weaving. They had a very distinctive culture expressed in their 
clothing, cuisine with a predilection for raw meat, and most notably in their sexual mores 
which appeared very lax and generally questionable to outsiders. They practiced 
cremation and revered their ancestors and some among then including the Duan clan 
were practicing Buddhists. Among the non-Buddhist clans killing and violence was said 
to be common. Calligraphy was practiced by the educated elite. Cowry shells were used 
as a common currency.26 
                                                 
25 Translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” pp. 131-49 
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The Wuman or Black Barbarians, also known as the Luoluo were distinguishable 
by the total absence of facial and head hair on the men. Li Jing claims that the men enjoy 
knives, fighting and killing, and even within families attacks using military weapons were 
common. Their cropped-tailed horses were famed and they traded them as far away as 
India. He also notes their reputation as able soldiers. Their juke (soldiers) were 
generously supported and furnished with valuable, expertly crafted armour and swords. 
Their arrows and javelins were tipped in a deadly and instantly effective poison and their 
attitude to their own death is possibly revealed in the euphemism ‘going home’ which 
they employed.27 Marco Polo reported that ‘they ride long like Frenchmen, and wear 
armour of boiled leather, and carry spears and shields and arblasts, and all their quarrels 
are poisoned.’28 
Li Jing again comments on their relaxed attitude to sex. In fact before marriage 
the bridegroom was expected not only to have sexual relations with the tribe’s shaman 
but was also expected to ‘dance’ with all the groom’s brothers to ensure that she was not 
a virgin on her wedding day. Though widespread throughout the region, these customs 
were regarded with horror by the region’s Han Chinese neighbours.  
The Gold-teeth Bai from Tibet are mentioned by Marco Polo, Rashīd al-Dīn, 
Banākatī, as well as Li Jing. Rashīd al-Dīn describes Qarajang as being peacefully 
bordered to the northwest by Tibet and the ‘Gold-Tooth people.’ Marco Polo describes 
the province of Zardandān as five days west of Qarajang and was so-called because the 
                                                 
27 All references to Li Jing are from Armijo-Hussein’s translation. See, Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” 
pp.131-49. 
 
28 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo. Eds. Trans. Henry Yule and Henri Cordier (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1992), Vol. 2, p. 78; also quoted in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 139. 
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people covered their teeth in a gold casing. These gold sheaths would be removed when it 
came time to eat.29 Banākatī claims that these people ate not only raw meat but were 
cannibals and consumed dead and carrion flesh.  
 
They eat carrion and also human flesh and they are obedient to the Qa’an. From 
here to the borders of Tibet they eat raw meat and consult idols and are shameless 
as regards their own women. The air is so putrid that (the people) are fearful of 
eating food after midday and they use women’s menstrual blood as an anecdote 
for food poisoning (‘ufūnat) and its pains. They boil sugar apples and eat 
winnowed barley.30  
 
This was not confirmed by the other more reliable sources that detailed their 
elaborate costumes and described how they also decorated their bodies in tattoos, a 
custom which clearly fascinated Marco Polo apparently witnessing it for the first time,31 
and shaved their heads and facial hair.  
 
The women pluck their eyebrows and eyelashes, do not wear make-up, put their 
hair up in two coils, wear embroided clothes, and adorn them by sewing on small 
shells. They work very hard at farming, never even stopping to take a break. Right 
up until delivering a baby, they hardly ever rest. When they give birth, they 
immediately take it up in their arms, wash it, in the river and then hand it over to 
the care of the father and return right to work themselves.32 
 
                                                 
29 Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi al-Tavārīkh, p. 442. 
 
30 Banākatī, Tārīkh-i Banākatī. Ed. Jafar Shiār (Tehran: Silsila-yi Intishārāt-i Anjuman-i Āthār-i Millī, 
1348 H.sh./1969), p. 323. 
 
31 Marco Polo, The Travels, Vol. 2, pp. 84-85 
 
32 Li Jing, Yunnan Zhilüe, translated and cited in Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 141. 
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This is basically confirmed by Marco Polo who adds that the father takes the 
mother’s place in the bed nursing the child himself for a further forty days.33 Li Jing 
describes the humid climate and the bamboo housing built on stilt and the fact that the 
people wash many times a day, bathing together without embarrassment. He describes a 
lack of an absolute authority or any system of rules and regulations which causes fatal 
disputes and arguments. Shamans exercise a great deal of power among the communities 
of the Zardandan. Marco Polo and Li Jing remark on the relaxed marriage customs, 
absence of spousal possessiveness and the absence of restrictions on union between close 
relatives. There are various sub-groups named after their personal customs of bodily 
decoration. 
The Mosu and Naxi lived north of Dali along the Jinsha River near the Tibetan 
border. The higher altitudes allows for a cooler climate and there are many sheep and 
horses. ‘Their villages are scattered like starts in the sky and are independent of one 
another.’ The men have a reputation as fighters and they all carry daggers. When 
altercations occur a gong is sounded and the women from the two factions are expected 
to intervene to prevent bloodshed. As with the other tribes they ‘have no prohibitions 
regarding licentious behavior.’ Their food is coarse and simple consisting for the main 
part of turnip with salt being their only seasoning. They do not follow either Confucius or 
the Buddha though they do practice annual religious rites and cremate their dead. 34 
The Tulao Barbarians, the Tulao Man, reside south of Xuzhou (Yibin, Sichwan 
Province) and north of Wumeng (Zhaotong). Marco Polo came across these people whom 
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he described as ‘tall and good-looking; their complexions inclining to brown rather than 
fair.’ He named the province as Tholoman where the towns and castles were perched on 
‘lofty mountains’ in the hidden caves of which the bodies of their cremated relatives are 
secreted. Gold was found in abundance here though for daily transactions Indian 
porcelain shells was the standard currency35 Lichees supplemented the income derived 
mainly from tea.36 
Other tribes recorded in the province include the Ye Man savages who lived 
scattered in the valleys west of Xunchuan and wear bark instead of clothes and whose 
appearance Li Jing found repulsive. Families contained up to ten wives and the tribes 
were hunter/gatherers rather than farmers and did not even use tools. They wrapped their 
food in banana leaves. The Woni or Hani lived very frugally 500 li southwest of Lin’an 
residing in the mountains and forests. Li Jing reports an anecdote to demonstrate their 
stupidity. They would hoard cowry shells and when they felt death approaching would 
confide the whereabouts of their secret hoards to their children but always with the 
following proviso. ‘I have buried a certain amount, you can take some of it, but do not 
touch the rest, for I will use it when I am re-born.’37 Lastly there are the Pu Barbarians, 
Pu Man or Puzi Man who came from west of the Lancang River and were known to be 
brave, strong, expert thieves, masters of the spear and crossbow and bare-back horse 
riders. Marco Polo knew them for their notoriety as brigands and idolaters. 
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36 Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 148. 
 
37 Armijo-Hussein, “Sayyid ‘Ajall,” p. 148. 
 
  20
The people are idolaters and an evil generation, holding it no sin to rob and 
maltreat: in fact, they are the greatest brigands on earth. They live by the chase, as 
well as on their cattle and the fruits of the earth. I should tell you also that in this 
country there are many of the animals that produce musk, which are called in the 
Tartar language Gudderi. Those rascals have great numbers of large and fine 
dogs, which are of great service in catching the musk-beasts, and so they procure 
great abundance of musk. They have none of the Great Kaan’s paper money, but 
use salt instead of money. They are very poorly clad, for their clothes are only of 
the skins of beasts, and of canvas, and of buckram.38 
 
Even though others had a crucial role in the conquest of the region, the Dali Stele 
is at pains to stress the debt the province owes their recently deceased emperor Qubilai: 
 
The benefaction of Shizhu emperor is infinite, like heaven and earth, contain 
everything of our world. People live in the world, enjoy the benefaction of heaven 
and earth, just like the plants enjoy the warm breeze, sunshine and the rainwater, 
all happy and comply with the order of nature, no matter we realize the order the 
nature or not. The great deeds and exploit of Shizhu emperor, like the hosts of 
heaven, are immortal. 
 
It must be assumed that this gratitude is an indirect way of praising the minister 
most associated with Yunnan and its stability and accompanying prosperity who assumed 
control after the actual conquest. Sayyid ‘Ajall is not only associated with Mongol rule in 
Yunnan but is remembered in his own right as almost the father of the province and his 
memory remains strong today with the Muslim population of the province hailing him as 
their illustrious ancestor. Before Sayyid ‘Ajall’s arrival the province had been ruled by a 
triumvirate comprising Mongol royalty, the Mongol military, and local leaders. These 
three groups would not have been as distinct as their names suggest and the elite which 
ruled the vast and growing empire was in no way ethnically pure and admission into the 
ruling ranks was an aspiration of members of many local elites. The formation of an 
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ethnically diverse elite, open to the aspirations of all and exclusive of few, was a 
development witnessed throughout the Toluid empire. Sayyid ‘Ajall himself was a third 
generation military administrator and he would have fully identified with the empire’s 
ruling circles. 
The grooming of the Duan clan at the expense of their rivals, the Gao who had 
served as the Duan kings’ ministers for the past century, was an act of astute political 
judgment on the part of the Mongols. This would prove to be highly beneficial to the 
invaders who were able to reap the gratitude of the Duans expressed through their loyalty 
and dependable service. 
Uriyangqadai found support from the Duan king crucial for his campaigns in the 
South. Though these campaigns resulted in a serious defeat and destroyed the Mongol 
reputation for invincibility as convincingly as the defeat at ‘Ayn Jālūd in 1260, 
Uriyangqadai down played the 1258 failure against the Vietnamese emperor, Trần Thái 
Tông. Uriyangqadai’s assault was part of a major, co-ordinated advance against the 
remnants of the Song. Möngke’s three-pronged strategy was launched in 1257 with an 
army under Qubilai Khan moving south from Kaiping, Möngke himself leading the main 
thrust from Ning Xia, and Uriyangqadai moving in from Dali towards Guilin with the 
plan being to meet up with Qubilai’s troops in a manoeuvre aimed at squeezing and 
herding the dispirited Song army in a classic pincer movement.  
However in order to link up with Qubilai’s army in southern China, Uriyangqadai 
would have to move through Dai Viet territory. Following classic Mongol strategy, 
Uriyangqadai requested passage for his army through Dai Viet land with his long-term 
objectives remaining hidden and together with Duan Xingzhi whose knowledge of the 
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local geography and topology was useful, led a combined force of 10,000 men to a camp 
on the Yunnan-Dai Viet border. Both sides were well prepared for war. Having seen the 
fall of Dali, Trần Thái Tông’s Royal Commander Tran Quoc Tuan had mobilised the 
whole population and had started intense training of his army. However, war with the 
Mongols whose ferocious reputation had preceded them was hardly relished. It is 
therefore surprising that more care was not taken of the envoys dispatched by 
Uriyangqadai. The Mongol general dispatched three envoys in all each requesting leave 
for his armies to proceed through Trần Thái Tông’s territory in order to reach southern 
China. Uriyangqadai’s envoys, the last sent in the last month of 1257, were all 
imprisoned by Trần Thái Tông.39  
Decisively the Vietnamese were able to keep their nerve long enough to survive 
the initial assault and subsequent occupation of their capital, and especially the wrath of 
the Mongols when they discovered one of their envoys dead.  
 
They entered an empty city and found their three envoys, who were all trussed up 
in jail. One of them died from his ordeal and, on seeing this, the Mongols went 
berserk, killing all the people and destroying much of the capital.40 
 
The Mongols had advanced into the Viet lands steadily and though initially 
daunted by the heavy use of elephants by their enemy, they had devised a strategy to deal 
with these mediaeval ‘tanks.’ Le Tac, a defector to the Mongols, reports that 
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‘Uriyangqadai’s son Ashu ordered the bowmen to shoot at the feet of the Tran’s 
elephants and the beasts ran amok, Tran’s troops were routed.’41 
They held out long enough to launch a counter-attack which saw the de-moralised 
Mongols who had been decimated by pestilence which was rampant in the deserted 
capital of Thăng Long (Ha Noi), ignominiously expelled after only one month into their 
campaign. On the twenty-ninth of January 1258 C.E., Emperor Trần Thái Tông, 
accompanied by his Crown Prince Hoảng, travelled by boat up the Red river from Thiên 
Mạc to arrive at the eastern gate of Thăng Long, scene of their hasty evacuation only 
days before. They ‘fought the enemy and took the city without much opposition’42 
The retreating Mongols earned the nickname ‘the Buddhist enemy’ because re-
tracing their steps back along the banks of the Red River they were too weak and de-
moralised to indulge in any looting or plundering along the way.43 An explanation for this 
unexpected defeat at the hands of their Vietnamese hosts lies primarily with the outbreak 
of ‘pestilence’ caused by rotting foodstuff, unburied corpses and the hot and humid 
climate in which vermin, fleas, and disease bearing rodents thrived. 
The account of this episode is only briefly sketched in the Yuan Shi and even the 
near contemporary Vietnamese annals, the official Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư, and An Nam 
Chi Lược written by Lê Tac, a defector to the Mongols, do not dwell on the Mongol 
defeat and yet it remains the first of a series of defeats in south-east Asia and serves as 
                                                 
41 An Nam Chí Luoc, by Lê Tac, trans. by The Committee for Translation of Vietnamese Historical 
Records, Hue University (Hue: Hue University Press, 1962), .p. 85, cited in Vu Hong Lienp.p.90 
 
42 Đại Việt Sử Ký Toàn Thư, Vol. 2, p 28, cited in Vu Hong Lien. P.102. 
 
43 Cited in Vu Hong Lien Warder, Mongol Invasions of South-East Asia and their Impact on Relations 
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much as ‘Ayn Jālūd and the ill-fated assaults on Japan as marking the end of the Mongols 
reputation for invincibility. Rashīd al-Dīn while not going into military details refers to 
the ‘unhealthy climate’ which had caused so many deaths, ‘more than five thousand.’44 
The reason for this lack of impact was simply that the defeat was dwarfed by the death of 
the Great Khan Möngke himself which meant a cessation of all military campaigns and 
offensives immediately and the formation of a quriltai to negotiate and elect a new Great 
Khan. 
While Duan Xingzhi, the Maharaja, and his army chief and uncle, Xin Jufu, 
provided practical support for general Uriyangqadai in his campaigns within Yunnan and 
south outside the province, Xin Juri also known as Duan Shi found it increasingly 
difficult to control the rivalries between the Mongol factions at home. The intrigues 
among the political elite of Dali climaxed in the assassination of Qubilai’s fifth son, 
Hügechi, the ‘Prince of Yunnan’ in which the pacification Officer and Military 
Commander of the Dali region, Bahā’ al-Dīn, and the official biographer, Huohuodai, 
were both implicated. Since few of the high officials in Yunnan at that time were Han 
Chinese the sources are quiet on events at the court in the years before the arrival of 
Sayyid ‘Ajall. However, the Yuan Shi contains the biography of Zhang Lidao who was 
employed as ‘personal secretary’ to Prince Hügechi and who was present at the time of 
the prince’s poisoning.45 It is from this account of Zhang Lidao’s rise and fall that some 
impressions of the intrigues at the Dali court emerge. 
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The poisoning of a prince would have been an audacious act at any time but the 
murder of a son of Qubilai Khan, glorious occupant of the Golden throne, suggests a 
conspiracy or suicidal rashness. Bahā’ al-Dīn would have been shocked and dismayed at 
the sudden enfeoffment and appointment in 1267 of Prince Hügechi and his team to the 
province. In all probability this local official felt far enough away from the centre of 
power to consider himself almost untouchable and very secure in his own ‘fiefdom’ and 
the imminent arrival of this royal party would have been very unwelcome. In addition it 
should be realised that the “branch secretariats were not organs of local government like 
the circuit (lu) bureaus of Song times”46 as David Farquhar has argued, but “separate 
vassal states surrounding a nuclear state” and that certainly Marco Polo and Rashīd al-
Dīn considered Yunnan to be almost a separate country with a great deal of autonomy.  
Zhang Lidao’s father, a scholar under the Jurchen dynasty, had served under Tolui 
and Zhang Lidao who had come to the notice of the court, was appointed Hügechi 
personal secretary after his ‘exemplary service’ in Tangut territory. His first act upon 
arriving in Qarajang (Yunnan) with the new title of “Bearer of the silver tablet.” was to 
make agriculture a top priority with the establishment of agricultural colonies, state run 
farms. Zhang Lidao assisted by Ming Duanfu, the Vice-President of one of the six boards 
was also charged with formalising a peace treaty and tribute agreement with Annan 
(Vietnam). According to official documents, Bahā’ al-Dīn prepared an official banquet to 
welcome the arrival of the royal party but he had secretly poisoned the food to be 
presented to Hügechi. Zhang Lidao had heard rumours of this plot and attempted to force 
his way into the banqueting hall in order to warn the prince. When he was forcibly 
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restrained the ensuing commotion came to the notice of the royal party who immediately 
commanded that Zhang Lidao be admitted. However, it was too late and in the words of 
the Yuan Shi’s biography of the personal secretary,  
 
The prince (Hügechi) took Lidao's hand for him to look down into his throat, but 
his flesh had already begun to rot, the poison had already taken effect. That night 
the prince died. Bahā’ al-Dīn proceeded to occupy the prince’s throne and sent 
men to harass the prince’s widow into handing over his official seal.47  
 
There is no suggestion that the Dali royal family, the Duan clan, were implicated 
in any way in the plot to assassinate the prince. Zhang Lidao organized a group of 
thirteen loyalists to resist the attempted coup d’état and inform the Great Qa’an but when 
they were discovered, Bahā’ al-Dīn had Zhang Lidao arrested. Before he was able to 
execute the faithful courtier, one of the group of thirteen loyalists, the Superintendent of 
Craftsmen, Zhang Zhong, sprung Lidao from jail and they fled from Dali to the Tibetan 
border. On the way they met an envoy already on its way to the province from Qubilai 
Khan. The group contained the official, Boroqan whom Qubilai had dispatched in 
response to the message that he had already received from Dali, and Qubilai’s personal 
tutor, Bie Tie. With these officials and the heavily armed delegation to support him, 
Zhang Lidao was able to return to Dali and have Bahā’ al-Dīn arrested and executed. 
Zhang Lidao was then summoned to Khan Baliq (Beijing), the capital, where he 
delivered a formal report on the circumstances surrounding the prince’s death to a tearful 
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Qubilai Khan. For his loyalty, Zhang Lidao was awarded fifty jiang of gold while the 
other loyal officials were given official positions.48 
Little documentary evidence is available to account for the few years between the 
events which followed Zhang Lidao’s return from Khan Baliq and the arrival of Sayyid 
‘Ajall in 1274. In Sayyid ‘Ajall’s official biography the event is recorded thus: 
 
In the eleventh year (of the Zhiyuan reign period, 1274), the emperor summoned 
Sayyid ‘Ajall and said to him: “Yunnan is a place I have personally been to, but 
because the officials that have been appointed there have not been appropriate, it 
has caused those distant peoples to be unrestful. I now wish to select someone 
who is both cautious and generous, to establish order there, and there is no one 
better than you.49 
 
Sayyid ‘Ajall is indelibly associated with Yunnan, as much today as he was in the 
thirteenth century. He moved not only his immediate office and family but his Muslim 
troops from Turkestan and all were expected to settle and take local wives, just as back in 
the 1250s the troops accompanying Hülegü had similarly taken permanent leave of their 
wives and children in the East with the expectation of establishing new families in Iran.50 
His appointment was in keeping with Mongol imperial policy which had already been 
successfully implemented in northern China and in Central Asia. The Sino-Khitan 
administration of Bukhara in the 1220s and 1230s, and the largely Khwarazmian-
Bukharan administration in Chung-tu (Beijing) for north China both stood as models for 
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further imperial expansion. In anticipation of the scale of the appointment he had been 
awarded, he sent his son, Naīr al-Dīn, ahead of him to make an appraisal of the county 
and open negotiations with the officials already there.  
The Mongol official in charge, Toqur (Tuohulu), an imperial prince, had been told 
by his staff that Sayyid ‘Ajall had been sent to depose him and restore direct rule from 
the capital. However, Naīr al-Dīn’s oratory gifts were the equal of his father and he was 
able to calm the fears and misgivings of Toqur and assure him that his father was looking 
forward to working with him, not against him. He even appointed Toqur’s own advisors 
as officials in his new administration. Sayyid ‘Ajall’s prompt moves to appease the 
Mongol elite of the province paid off and there were no reported assassination attempts 
and the transition from military rule to civilian government proceeded smoothly.  
Qubilai Khan had given the separation of military rule from the civilian 
administration priority and had tried to institute his policies wherever and whenever it 
was possible. Yunnan under Sayyid ‘Ajall was one of the few provinces where this 
separation was actually realised. In early 1275, the following petition was submitted to 
Khan Baliq (Beijing); 
 
In the twelfth year (of the Zhiyuan reign period, 1275), he presented the following 
memorial: “In Yunnan the barbarians who have yet to be incorporated are many, I 
request that the Pacification Bureau jointly with the Military Command deal with 
this, under the jurisdiction of the regional secretarial council.” Another memorial 
stated: 'The territory of Qarajang (Halazhang) is almost the same as Yunnan, and 
the prefectures and counties are administered by myriarchs (commander of 
10,000) and chiliarchs (commander of 1000) and this should be changed to 
civilian officials." And the emperor agreed. By the thirteenth year (of the Zhiyuan 
reign period, 1276), all the prefectures and counties had been changed and it was 
reported.51 
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With the arrival of Sayyid ‘Ajall, Yunnan experienced a period of prosperity and 
stability which also marked the absorption of the province into China proper, a reality 
manifest in Yunnan’s status today. To consolidate his hold on the province, Sayyid ‘Ajall 
moved the capital from Dali to Kunming where it remains to this day. He was determined 
from the off-set to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people and with this aim in mind, he 
concentrated on four areas of the economy namely the development of agriculture with 
the introduction of new crops and more advanced agricultural methods, the stimulation of 
regional markets and local trade, taxation flexibility to promote trade along with 
exemptions from new currency regulations, and the exploitation of Yunnan’s mineral 
potential. Interestingly, rather than introducing Muslim, western Asian or even Mongol 
customs to underpin his reforms, Sayyid ‘Ajall implemented Chinese practices, 
promoting the use of Chinese marital and funeral ceremonies, building Confucian 
schools, and distributing copies of Confucian classics.52 
To strengthen the foundations of his agricultural policies, Sayyid ‘Ajall published 
and circulated handbooks on farming techniques and livestock maintenance to 
accompany the distribution of seeds, tools, and livestock. These packages were given to 
both indigenous farmers and immigrants who had arrived with Sayyid ‘Ajall. Agronomy 
was a subject which flourished under Mongol patronage and scholarly and scientific 
connections across the Empire were facilitated by the strong ties established between the 
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Han-lin Academy and what was to become the Rab-i Rashīdī.53 Rice production, 
regulated forestry, mulberry trees and hemp under-pinned by an irrigation system 
employing dams, resevoirs, and controlled flooding were all introduced at this time and 
have continued in the Kunming area to this day. Arriving with his entourage were many 
Muslim merchants and traders whose expertise, commercial connections and 
entrepreneurial spirit opened up what was once a barbarian backwater of the Sung 
Empire to a wide and receptive world outside. The traditional use of cowry shells for 
commerce was allowed and the tax system and the corvée burden were lightened to 
encourage the involvement of the local people.54 
Stories of Sayyid ‘Ajall’s enlightened dealings with the locals are common. One 
Ming source reports a conversation in which the governor indulges in some heavy 
bargaining with some locals over how much tax they should contribute to the 
government. However, the traditional roles appear reversed and it is Sayyid ‘Ajall who is 
arguing for the reduction in tax and trying hard to dissuade the farmers from committing 
themselves to too high a rate, and convincing them to choose a more appropriate form of 
payment, be it silver, horses, shells or oxen. He threatens to decide himself on the amount 
and method of taxation if they should continue to offer unreasonably high rates of 
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taxation.55 The continued use of cowry shells by the indigenous people which was 
permitted by Sayyid ‘Ajall went in direct contradiction to the directive from Qubilai 
Khan who had ordained that the use of paper currency was to be mandatory through out 
his lands. Sayyid ‘Ajall was convinced that a disruption of the centuries old monetary 
system who disrupt trade and irrecoverably damage the local economy. His defiant plea 
for an exemption was highly controversial but it is a measure of the regard and trust in 
which he was held that the exemption was granted.  
However, even though the province of Dali which came under Sayyid ‘Ajall’s 
direct control enjoyed the benefits of full participation in a global economy with the 
security and global access that membership of the empire entailed, there is considerable 
evidence that there was discontent in the neighbouring states. A complicated system of 
control and delegation of authority had emerged as a result of the negotiated peace and 
settlement which had replaced the traditional methods of Mongol occupation. The 
inducements to cooperate and accept Mongol sovereignty were considerable and the fact 
that the implicit threat of violence was not the main factor says much for the 
transformation of the culture which pervaded all levels of this global Toluid Empire. 
Military out-posts and small garrisons were established throughout the region. 
Seventy-eight postal relay stations (yam/yizhan) between Dali eastward to Shicheng and 
the main east-west highway connecting Dali and the new capital Shanchan (Kunming) 
was repaired. Each postal station included a small military unit conscripted locally, a 
stable of fifty horses, provisions for overnight guests, and a general store. A prestigious 
title was awarded the local notable who would assume responsibility for the up-keep and 
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functioning of the station and hostel and the original five-year renewable posting was 
soon made into a sought after hereditary position which provided an element of stability 
and status.56 
Stability, status and most importantly a sense of inclusion and imperial connection 
were concerns which Sayyid ‘Ajall addressed by substituting the military institutions 
established by Uriyangqadai with often locally appointed political units of over-lapping, 
multilayered civilian jurisdictions. This multiplicity of political units allowed the ruling 
elite deeper penetration and more comprehensive control of the population while at the 
same time these units offered the indigenous population involvement in the complex 
political system and responsibility for their own future and well-being as well as 
instituting a recognisable path to political, financial, and social advancement. To reduce 
the demands on outside officials the post of Tuguan was created and this influential office 
was offered to local headmen and leaders in return for sworn loyalty to the Great Khan in 
order to ‘make officials out of native chieftains.’57 The post was made hereditary and 
conferred considerable status and local power and though a darughachi was always 
appointed at the same time, complete parity was maintained as regards salary, office land 
and rank. This system worked well within the province of Dali though incidents of 
resentment, misunderstandings, intrigue, and even rebellion are recorded when the 
system was applied to the lands lying to the east. 
Education was central to Sayyid ‘Ajall’s plans for political reform and economic 
development and to this end he oversaw the construction of schools to which the local 
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notables were encouraged to send their children. His intention was that the reliance on 
Han Chinese administration officials could be broken. These educational facilities were 
financed by xuetian which in the Islamic world were referred to as waqfs. In all fifty-five 
schools were endowed in this manner and his colleagues were encouraged to follow his 
example so that the cost of education did not become a burden on the local population. 
Dali benefited initially but after the administration moved to Kunming schools were 
opened there also and by the end of the Yuan period schools were found in a number of 
urban centres in the province. In fact Sayyid ‘Ajall was simply implementing Mongol 
policy on education with a little more enthusiasm than found elsewhere. The Yuan Shi 
contains a section devoted to schools (juan 8, p. 2032) where Mongol policy and practice 
is elaborated. Qubilai Khan decreed that schools be established in all districts and that 
children should be allowed access and that scholars be enabled to continue their studies 
for the further benefit of the administration.58  
Though he ruled for only six years he achieved a great deal and the outpouring of 
genuine grief at his death, attests to the impression that he made on the people, both 
indigenous and immigrants. 
 
Sayyid ‘Ajall lived in Yunnan for six years, and when he died in the 16th year of 
the Zhiyuan reign period (1279), at the age of 69 sui, the people cried in the 
streets, and he was buried outside the north gate of Shanshan. The king of Jiaozhi 
sent a delegation of 12 people wearing mourning attire. They prepared an elegy 
for the memorial rites, and it included the following words, “He gave birth to us 
and educated us, and we mourn him as our father and our mother” and this caused 
them to wail and cry uncontrollably.59 
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The establishment of Mongol rule in Yunnan was noteworthy in that the 
traditional brutal methods of subjugation were abandoned even in the face of extreme 
provocation, a policy which is commemorated on the re-discovered Dali Stele. This 
policy of avoiding bloodshed was continued and found expression in the rule of Sayyid 
‘Ajall, Even when provoked in the extreme Sayyid ‘Ajall made the avoidance of 
bloodshed a priority. The rebellion of Luopan Dian (Yuanjiang, 100 miles southwest of 
Kunming) ended in peaceful surrender after the rebel leaders heard of Sayyid ‘Ajall’s 
anger and threats of execution for treason towards his own men who had disobeyed his 
orders of restraint towards the rebels. Sayyid ‘Ajall’s main concern throughout the 
incident was to the possibility of death and harm to innocents and his own soldiers.  
 
I am not concerned about the attack, I am worried about you who will be rushing 
towards the points of swords, and if you are not fortunate the innocents will be 
killed; and I am also worried that you will plunder and enslave peaceful people, 
who will then no longer have any means to support themselves, and they will 
have to rebel again.60 
 
The criticism levelled against these policies and the blame directed at them61 for 
the continued, low level unrest in the provinces to the east of Dali amounts to a small 
price to have paid for what was essentially a period of comparative peace. The local 
sources paint a confused and hardly sympathetic picture but too much can be read into 
such detailed observations. The larger view and the legacy which Sayyid ‘Ajall left 
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behind suggest a far less hostile reality, and certainly for those on the ground in Dali 
province Sayyid ‘Ajall and his progeny were respected and popular figures. In fact claims 
to blood links to Sayyid ‘Ajall are not uncommon both in China and Iran. The Safavid 
historian, Khwandamīr (d. 1539-40), claims descent from Sayyid ‘Ajall through his 
grandfather, Mīrkhwand (d. 1498), on his mother’s side. A tomb of a local notable in 
Quanzhou claims family ties reaching back to Bokhara with another claiming to be his 
son. In fact so many tombs in Quanzhou dating from the Yuan era claim connections with 
Sayyid ‘Ajall that Bai Shoufi finds them questionable.62 The leading Nestorian cleric, 
Mar Sargis, would have spread the good name of his governor after serving in Yunnan 
with Sayyid ‘Ajall in 1272. He later returned to eastern China where he was responsible 
for the construction of a number of churches including the elusive Nestorian church of 
Hangzhou.63 There is a stele in the mosque of Hangzhou which reports that “During the 
years Hongwu (1368-98), there was a descendent in the seventh generation of Saiyyid 
Ajall, prince of Xianyang, named Ha Zhe (Hajji), who went to the imperial audience to 
hear the emperor's orders proclaimed. He was given permission to build mosques in all 
provinces and, during the following eras, decrees conferring favours were given to them 
as if this had been a permanent law.”64 
The significance of the Dali Stele is that it showed a new direction and attitude in 
the policies of the Mongols towards the indigenous people and a deeper awareness of 
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alternative methods of pacification and the fostering of loyalty. Through much of the 
thirteenth century the Mongols had nurtured a reputation for ferocity and ruthless 
militarism. The Dali Stele presented a total contrast. The picture presented permeating the 
words, was a vision of a new era and a new philosophy. The message engraved on the 
Dali Stele was in sharp contrast to the image of Mongol tradition and it clearly 
exemplified the emerging era of the Toluids, now undisputed rulers of the Mongol 
Empire, and founders of thrones in Persia and a united China. The Toluids not only 
represented a period of prosperity and relative stability but they oversaw and guided the 
emergence of a new multi-ethnic elite with a global outlook which was reflected in their 
eclectic culture fusing elements from east and west and expressed in everything from 
their cuisine, to the histories produced in the Han-lin Academy and the miniatures of its 
sister institution, the Rab-i-Rashīdī of Tabriz. The Toluids were eager to fuse their 
leadership, their ideals and their future into the developing dominant culture. In both Iran 
and China and in these new regions which they were moulding into their empire, they 
wanted legitimacy, acceptance and mutual fusion. In Iran they had respected clerics such 
as Baiāwī65 re-working history to incorporate their dynasty into the great tide of 
inevitable time and in Khanbaliq Chinese scholars were already working on the histories 
of three dynasties which had now given way to Qubilai’s Yuan Empire. In Iran Naīr al-
Dīn ūsī prepared lectures and wrote notes for visiting scholars from China while 
churches opened their doors to bishops from Qubilai’s capital. In China a Persian 
entrepreneur, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn re-built the Walin Mosque in Hangzhou, still standing and 
functioning to this day, while the Muslim governor of Quanzhou presided over a 
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booming economy fuelled by a prosperous and expanding Muslim population. There 
were many urban centres prospering and growing from the new markets opened by the 
Iran/China union and in the late thirteenth century, early fourteenth century trade and 
exchange were at a peak. The Dali Stele celebrates Qubilai and his inclusion of Dali and 
the surrounding lands into his global Yuan-Ilkhanid empire. Sayyid ‘Ajall stands as an 
embodiment of the Toluid vision and the Dali Stele a celebration of that vision. 
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